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Risk Financing in Labour Managed Economies: 
The Commitment Problem 
by 
E . S C H L I C H T and C. C. V O N W E I Z S Ä C K E R 
Bielefeld and B o n n 
1. I n t r o d u c t i o n 
Capi ta l ism has turned out to be a m u c h more robust economic System 
than most of its socialist and conservative crit ics i n the nineteenth 
Century have forecast. I t has, of course, changed substant ial ly: labour 
relations, the rö le of government, the d is t r ibut ion of income are quite 
different now from what they were, say, 110 years ago, the publ ica t ion 
date of volume I of " D a s K a p i t a l " . B u t , inspite of " M i t b e s t i m m u n g " i n 
Germany, one th ing has remained remarkably stable i n the Western 
wor ld : the formal au thor i ty of decision mak ing i n the firm rests w i t h the 
"owners", i .e . those persons who provide the r isk bearing capi tal . I t is 
claimed by critics that this arrangement w i t h i n the factory and the firm 
prevents work ing conditions wh ich are i n accordance wi th human needs 
for involvement , par t ic ipa t ion , self-esteem, free Cooperation among 
equals, e tc . 1 . T rad i t i ona l economies has three possible answers to this 
cr i t ic i sm: 1. I t is empir ica l ly false to say that i n present day capital ism 
these needs cannot bc fulfilled. T h e y can be fulfilled and are fulfilled. 
2. The critics exaggerate these needs. T o the extent that work relations 
are not i n accordance to these needs this is due to a lacking willingness 
to pay for having these needs fu l f i l l ed 2 . 3. Th i s cr i t ic ism is basically 
correct and herc wc encounter an impor tan t case of market failure which 
needs detailed invest igat ion. W h i c h of these answers is correct, is ma in ly 
1 There is, of course, a vast literature on this point. See for example P . 
B l u m b e r g , Al icnat ion and Part icipation: Conclusions, i n J . V a n e k (ed.), Seif 
Management: Economic Liberat ion of Man, Harmondsworth 1975, pp. 324-
338, and other articles i n Vanek (ed.), op. cit . 
2 E . G . D o h m , Alienation, Freedom, and Economic Organization, Journal 
of Pol i t ica l Economy, V o l . 79 (1971), pp. 1090-1092, explains and critisises 
this argument. 
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an empir ical question. W e do not want to commit ourselves to one of the 
three answers. B u t , we do not see any strong reason to exclude answer 
no. 3 and this is w h y we want to contribute to the theory of labour managed 
firms. A system of labour managed firms combines the pr inc ip le of decen-
t ra l iza t ion v i a markets w i t h a decision strueture, wh ich supposedly is 
more appropriate for nonauthor i tar ian, par t ie ipatory labour relations. 
Economists have t aken up this topic recently i n increasing numbers. 
One of the topics wh ich has d rawn specific a t tent ion is the problem of 
financing labour managed firms. Th i s problem is in t r ins i ca l ly difficult 
due to its inseparabi l i ty from the problem of r isk a n d mora l hazard. W e 
first proeeed to consider i n t u rn four different modes of financing. W e 
then t ry to discuss the issue from a somewhat more fundamental view-
point . 
2. M o d e no . 1: I n t e r n a l F i n a n c i n g 
V a n e k has argued convincingly that in ternal financing w i l l lead to 
extremely restr ict ive investment behaviour of a labour managed firm3. 
I f a vo t ing member of the firm expects to leave the firm at some date i n 
the future, he is on ly interested i n the benefits of the investment accuring 
before he leaves. B u t even i f he were not to leave and wou ld l ive forever 
he creates an ex t ema l i t y to those future colleagues who do not share i n 
the b ü r d e n of foregoing present consumption (because they arrive after 
the investment) but who benefit from the investment. Thus , unless the 
members of the fiim remain ident ical for the whole l ifet ime of the firm, 
future benefits are col lect ively discounted more than corresponding to 
the personal preferences of the indiv iduals mak ing the decisions. W e may 
cal l this problem the "wpward blas i n time preference of collective deci-
sions". I t is, of course, a phenomenon encountered i n other circumstances, 
too. Take the case of po l i t i ca l decisions on the communal or town level 
i n a system of fiscal federalism. I f people are rather mobi le they w i l l 
prefer decisions reflecting high rates of t ime preference, because they w i l l 
be affected only as long as they l ive i n the Community 4. 
The t ime preference bias has another interesting impl i ca t ion for labour 
managed firms. I t leads to a subopt imal firm size. F o r one way to avoid 
Investments is not to expand manpower. A firm w i t h a high rate of time 
3 See J . Vanek, The Basic Theory of Financing of Partieipatory Firms, i n : 
Vanek (ed.), op. ci t . , pp. 448-449, and A . B . A t k i n s o n , Worker Management 
and the Modern Industrial Enterprise, Quarterly Journal of Economies, Vo l . 
87 (1973), p. 383. 
4 This is different, if they own property in the Community, which they seil 
when they move. The logical consequence would be to restrict voting rights 
to property owners i n towns and other local communitics, a system which 
was widespread i n Europe before the introduetion of general equal suffrage. 
For obvious reasons we should not a im for the restoration of such a system. 
B u t the historical developments i n regard to participation i n political deci-
sions might perhaps be indicative of future development of workers partici-
pation and labour management. 
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preference w i l l therefore ceteris paribus be smaller than a firm wi th a low 
rate of t ime preference. 
I f Y = F ( K , N ) is the product ion funct ion of the firm and if, i n equi-
l i b r i u m , the firm maintains its capital stock through t ime, then the margi-
na l p roduc t iv i ty of capi tal F K is just equal to the rate of t ime preference, 
g. The firm w i l l adapt employment to the level where Output per worker 
is maximized, i .e . where 
J F 
*ü N F N - F 
3 N = N > = ° O R 
where the elast ici ty of product ion w i t h respect to labour equals un i ty : 
N F N 
F 
A t the equi l ibr ium point substantial economies of scale prevai l . 
The scale elast ici ty of Output is 
F N • N , F K • K Q K 
F ~t~ F + F 
and hence much above un i ty . The equi l ib r ium firm size is below the 
Opt imum size. L e t us cal l this the firm size bias of collective decisions. 
3. M o d e no . 2: F i x e d I n t e r e s t E x t e r n a l F i n a n c i n g 
V a n e k argues that a labour managed economy needs a banking system 
w h i c h provides external financing i n a generous fashion so as to avo id the 
prob lem of seif financing just discussed 5 . I t is trae that the t ime prefe-
rence bias and the firm size bias could i n principle be avoided, i f the 
f i rm were completely external ly financed. T h e n income of workers would 
be equal to the residual from value added after subtract ion of interest 
payments . The marginal p roduc t iv i ty of capi tal wou ld be equal to the 
interest rate (which supposedly can be considered to reflect prefcrences 
a n d opportunities i nvo lved i n Society's inter temporal decisions). The 
res idual income for workers (r = interest rate) 
F ( K , N ) r K 
is max imized when 
5 Vanek argues that the competitive domination of labour managed firms 
by privately owned firms can be explained by the fact that labour managed 
firms were compelled to finance themselves internally, see Vanek, op. ci t . , 
p. 453. 
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and 
dw_ _ N F N — { F — r i q 
8 N ~ iV* 
= 0 or 
F — r K 
N = Fjsr or w F N 
so that the scale elast ici ty is 
F N N F K K F — F K K F K K = 1 
F F F F 
Hence the op t imum firm size is at tained. 
B u t the problem w i t h fixed interest financing is twofold. I f i t worked 
i n the manner described, then there would be no r isk-sharing between 
the firm and the rest of the economy. A l l the r isk wou ld have to be borne 
by the workers of the f i rm. Th i s is the risk bearing problem. I t arises to 
some degree also i n capi tal ism. B u t i n addi t ion the system cannot work 
that way. The banks must take precaution not to loose money on bad 
risks and not to be cheated by borrowers. A g a i n s imilar problems arise 
i n a capitalist environment. I m p l i c i t l y banks who lend money get i n v o l -
ved i n the investment decisions of potent ia l and actual borrowers, i f they 
want to dist inguish between good and bad risks. Th i s runs against the 
principle of decentralized decision mak ing . W e m a y thus cal l th is the 
incomplete decentralization problem. I n addi t ion , the poss ibi l i ty of bank-
ruptcy causes a m o r a l hazard problem. Borrowers m a y be lack ing effort 
to operate successfully i f i n r i sky situations substantial parts of the losses 
can be gol r i d off b}^ bankruptcy. This problem m a y be much more severe 
for a labour managed firm than for a capitalist firm. Decis ion makers i n 
the labour managed firm are l i ke ly to r u n away after bad luck has h i t 
the firm: the probabi l i ty of leaving a firm is correlated w i t h the business 
condi t ion of the firm. A h ighly profitable firm w i l l suffer fewcr diopouts 
of decision makers than a n unprofitable one. Thus the ra t iona l i ty of 
decisions i n a firm deteriorates as its prof i tabi l i ty deteriorates. Therefore 
lending to a firm of yet unknown future prof i tabi l i ty may be much more 
r i sky i n a labour managed system than i n a capitalist system. 
F i x e d interest external financing is possible wherever the lender obtains 
a collateral l ike a mortgage against his loan. Thus equipment which keeps 
i n value even outside of the product ion process, i n wh ich i t is now used, 
can be more easily financed by loans than other Investments. 
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4. M o d e n o . 3: E x t e r n a l F i n a n c i n g by N o n v o t i n g S h a r e s 
This mode of financing has been proposed by Nutzinger as an answer 
to the problem posed by fixed interest financing6. People p rov id ing 
capi tal to a labour managed firm receive dividends i n propor t ion to the 
incomes paid to the workers, or, to generalize the proposal, in proport ion 
to a function of incomes pa id to the workers. 
The proposal has a certain s imi la r i ty to share-ciopping arrangements 
wh ich have been used and s t i l l are used i n many parts of the wor ld . The 
r isk is d iv ided between the worker (or the tenant i n the share-cropping 
case) and the financier (or the l and owner i n the share-cropping case). I ts 
attractions are the expl ic i t Separation of decision mak ing author i ty and 
parts of the r isk bea i ing function. B u t , whenever this Separation occurs, 
certain control schemes are necessary. There is a lways the danger that 
decision makers i n such a Situation work against the interest of r isk 
bearing nondecision makers. O n the other hand, under certain c i rcum-
stances such schemes work quite well. Af te r all , the smal l shareholder 
of the large capitalist publ ic Company does not part icipate in the decision 
mak ing process either. B u t the evaluat ion of the Performance of the 
management by the stock market together w i t h certain addi t ional 
audi t ing instrumenta make the Separation of ownership and control the 
predominant and a very effective set-up for runn ing large commercial 
Operations. V e r y large risks indeed can be absorbed this way. 
I f the method of farming the l and has a substantial impact upon the 
value of the land , share-cropping is not v iable except for the case that 
the tenant can be t ied down to the l and for a long period of t ime. S imi -
l a r ly provis ion of r isk bearing capital can only work i n a labour managed 
environment, if the decision makers accept certain l imi t s of their autho-
r i t y 7 . N o n v o t i n g shareholders must have some access to the books of the 
firm. T h e firm cannot be a l lowed to pay out to the workers more than is 
real ly earned. Otherwise, rather than operating some productive ac t iv i ty , 
it could take the money provided by the nonvot ing shareholders, dis t r i -
6 H . G. N u t z i n g e r , Die Stellung des Betriebes i n der sozialistischen Wir t -
schaft, Frankfurt und New Y o r k 1974, pp. 285-287. 
7 They cannot be allowed, for instance, to determine the capital intensity 
freely for a givcn araount of capital. Else i t w i l l pay to reducc employrnent 
and increase the capital intensity continuously, since this w i l l increase labour 
productivi ty and per capita earnings. Capital productivi ty, however, w i l l be 
rcduced thercby, and this w i l l reduce the income of the shareholders if i t is 
t ied to the sum of the incomes the workers receive. This difficulty arises from 
the fact that the target of the workers is per c a p i t a income, whereas the 
shareholders w i l l be interested i n t o t a l income. This remains true if the market 
valuation of shares is taken into aecount: I n contrast to the shareholders, 
the workers wi l l always be interested i n per-capita targets l ike the present 
value of the firm per head - a point which ought to be added to N u t z i n g e r ' s 
argument, see N u t z i n g e r , op. cit . , p. 286. 
This difficulty can be remedied, however, if the income of the shares is 
t ied directly to the target the workers pursue: If e.g. the income of one share 
equals the income of an average worker, this conflict of interests disappears. 
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bute i t according to the formula agreed upon, and dissolve itself. Rules 
that prevent this are easily devised, but some external aud i t i ng for the 
benefit of the nonvot ing shareholders is necessary. 
B u t i n addi t ion, i t remains, of course, true that the par t i cu la r mora l 
hazard problem of labour managed firms remains. The po ten t ia l non-
vo t ing shareholder must be afraid to give money to a f i rm w h i c h has less 
than average prof i tabi l i ty . F o r he must be afraid that people are t h i n k i n g 
of leaving this firm and that therefore their decisions are v e r y short-
sighted. Should he invest his money under such condit ions i n th is firm ? 
I f at a l l then only b y asking for m u c h higher share i n income p a i d out, 
wh ich i n i tself increases the incentive of workers to leave the f i rm. O n the 
other hand profitable firms w i t h a low rate of ou tward labour m o b i l i t y 
w i l l , of course, have an easy t ime finding addi t iona l financing b y issuing 
nonvot ing shares. 
5. M o d e n o . 4: L e a s i n g 
Leasing of equipment is wel l k n o w n i n capital ist economies. Leasing 
w i t h a fixed rental payment per year has the advantage over purchasing 
that i t is the supplier 's rather than the user's credit potent ia l which is 
used. T o the extent that the supplier is considered a better r i sk by the 
banks the net effect of leasing on investment ac t i v i t y i n the economy is 
posit ive. Moreover, leasing could be combined w i t h r isk sharing of the 
lessor, i f the lessor would agree to receive payment i n propor t ion to some 
funct ion of income payments to the workers 8 . Leasing thus can serve an 
aux i l i a ry function to external financing, but i t is obviously l i m i t e d to the 
financing of capi tal embodied i n pieces of equipment, whose properties 
lend themselves to leasing. 
I n industries wh ich are characterized b y very capi tal intensive pro-
duct ion methods leasing might p lay a par t icular rö le . The to ta l equipment 
might be owned by a single external financier (the government?) con-
t ract ing i t out to a labour managed firm on a r isk sharing basis. The 
financier here is much more invo lved i n the decision process since any 
decision i n v o l v i n g a change of equipment has to be t aken j o i n t l y wi th 
h i m . Thus i n this case leasing would be a form of external financing which 
l imi ts the decision mak ing autonomy of the worker managed firm sub-
s tant ia l ly . 
I t should be noted that the actual Yugos l av system has characteristics 
of some s imi la r i ty to the leasing system. 
6. T h e C o m m i t m e n t M e c h a n i s m i n C a p i t a l i s m 
I n this second part of the paper we want to discuss what we think is 
the common denominator of the different problems encountered i n 
financing labour managed firms. W e cal l i t the commitment problem. 
8 To avoid the difficulty mentioned i n the foregoing footnote, the income 
could be tied to average per capita income, however. 
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Decision makers of an Organisation only tend to make ra t ional decisions 
for their Organisation, i f they are personally commit ted to share the 
consequences of these decisions. A n Organisation can only hope to get 
risk-sharing support from outside, i f these potent ia l outside supporters 
believe that good decisions are being taken w i t h i n the Organisation. T h e y 
w i l l therefore insist to see what the specific commitment mechanism for 
the organisation's decision makers is. W e therefore have to discuss the 
commitment mechanisms i n labour managed economies. 
Since we are concerned w i t h the financing of labour managed firms we 
concentrate on the inter temporal dimension of decisions. L e t us look at 
the commitment mechanisms avai lable to capitalist firms. The share-
holders, who form the ul t imate decision body i n the enterprise, do not 
have to remain shareholders i n order to make appropriate investment 
decisions. This is so, because they are interested i n the long r u n profit-
ab i l i t y of the firm, even i f they seil the shares tomorrow. T h e y obta in a 
higher price for their shares i f the prof i tabi l i ty prospects of the firm are 
better. The true commitment mechanism is not the i m m o b i l i t y of the 
shareholder's person. I t is the commitment of the shareholder's capi tal 
to the Company, the inab i l i t y to get this capi ta l back before the other 
shareholders get their 's back. S i m i l a r l y the owner of a house i n a Com-
m u n i t y is interested i n the long r u n ra t iona l i ty of Community decisions 
even i f i t is l i k e l y that he w i l l move out short ly. I t is his immovable 
property by which he is commit ted to the Community. Thus commitment 
is possible without personal i m m o b i l i t y b y the Inst i tut ion of transferable 
property rights. 
A different commitment mechanism is used i n capi ta l ism for top 
management of large companies. The decision makers of these firms 1. get 
pa id i n a way which makes them interested i n max imiz ing actual profits 
and future prof i tabi l i ty prospects of the firm (profit related bonuses, 
stock options etc.), 2. are part of a job market whose m a i n Performance 
cri terion again is present value of profits of the companies (or divisions 
of companies) which they run , and 3. derive their social prestige and self-
esteem again from successes measured b y similar cri teria. N o w , i t is i m -
portant to realize that profit here is an indirect cr i ter ion: i t is not con-
sumpt ion of shareholders. I t is a balance sheet coneept and at any given 
t ime there can be differences of opin ion about the prof i tabi l i ty of the 
firm i n question. Here lies a substantial source of error and i t is not true, 
therefore, that top management is commit ted to the max imiza t i on of 
expected long r u n prof i tabi l i ty of the Company. There w i l l be a bias 
towards those components of long r u n prof i tabi l i ty which are more easily 
reflected i n short r u n Signals of long r u n prof i tabi l i ty , such as operating 
profit of the current year (this bias m a y be par t ly or completely com-
pensated or over-compensated by the t ax laws). There w i l l also be a bias 
against r i sky activi t ies, because by the very nature of Performance 
measurement under imcomplete Information, managers cannot spread 
the risks of decision for wh ich they are responsible 9 . One impor tant 
The members of labour managed firms face a similar problem. Due to 
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ingredient of the commitment mechanism when au thor i ty is delegated 
to appointed managers is the prospect or expectat ion of a long te rm of 
office. The manager on ly then w i l l reckon that his Performance w i l l be 
evaluated not only by short-term results. I t must be a mis take (or a 
sign that au thor i ty has not been delegated) i f the board changes top 
management too frequently. 
7. T r a d e a b l e J o b R i g h t s as A n s w e r t o t h e 
C o m m i t m e n t P r o b l e m 
A p p l y i n g these ideas to a system of labour managed firms we arrive 
at a scheme wh ich i n i tself probably is not ve ry a t t ract ive to socialist 
advocates of labour managed firms: the separabi l i ty or transferabil i ty 
of job rights. Before we describe this system, let us stress that we do not 
t h i n k this to be a realist ic scheme, pa r t ly for reasons g iven later, par t ly 
for reasons not discussed i n this paper. W e discuss the scheme s imp ly to 
discover the logical structure of the commitment problem w i t h which 
we are concerned. 
Jobs i n such a system would be bought by workers from other workers 
or from firms expanding the number of Jobs. Assuming that the labour 
force is homogeneous in terms of ski l ls and other characteristics impor-
tant for Cooperation i n the firm, a free trade i n Jobs of any g iven firm 
could take place. These tradable job rights are the precise analogue of 
tradable shares i n a capitalist environment. T h e y combine m a x i m u m 
personal m o b i l i t y w i t h a Solution to the commitment problem. Holders 
of job rights w i l l make decisions i n accordance w i t h the long r u n interest 
of the firm, because they want to maximize the present market value 
of their tradable job rights. 
W e mentioned earlier that prof i tabi l i ty differences of firms tend to 
become accentuated due to the negative correlation of ou tward mob i l i t y 
and prof i tabi l i ty . Th i s problem no longer arises here (except i n extreme 
cases of near bankruptcy) . J o b rights of less profitable firms w i l l have 
a lower market value. Indeed, the market values of job rights of different 
firms reflect the different propensities to move from one firm to the other, 
and in equ i l ib r ium the representative buyer of a job r ight is indifferent 
between an expensive one and a cheap one. G i v e n these circumstances 
the specific labour management induced bias of the financiers towards 
profitable firms disappears. Those biases that m a y s t i l l remain are to be 
explained along s imilar lines on those that may exist under capi tal ism. 
8. I m m o b i l i t y as a C o m m i t m e n t M e c h a n i s m 
A p a r t from obvious problems of equi ty (which could par t ly be mended 
by appropriate modifications) the system is not feasible, because job 
the " r i sky shift" phenomenon, however, which arises in. group decisions, risk 
aversion of the labour managed firm might be smaller; see P . R . H o f stätter, 
Gruppendynamik, 2nd ed., Hamburg 1957, pp. 123-127. 
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rights arc of a nature different from d iv idend shares i n large capitalist 
companies. J o b rights are obviously also job obligations. There is no 
such thing as absentee job ownership (except i n certain lat ter day capita-
l i s t Systems where up to a point you are protected legal ly or de facto from 
dismissal even i f y o u don' t care to show up at work) . These job obligations 
require Cooperation w i t h others and these others need to protect their 
interests b y par t ic ipa t ing i n the decision about membership i n the f irm. 
A labour managed firm, even a large one, is thus closer i n nature to a 
business partnership t han to its larger younger cousin, the publ ic Joint 
stock Company. B u t a property r ight , which only can be sold w i t h the 
consent of a large group of people, implies incomplete separabil i ty of 
person and property r ight . True , i t is i n the interest of a l l partners, i .e . 
of a l l holders of such property rights, to make transferabil i ty comparati-
v e l y easy. B u t there are obvious conflicts of interest, e. g. between o ld 
workers (who are interested i n a m a x i m u m present market value of the 
property r ight) and young (who want to ma in t a in control over the selec-
t i o n of colle&gues w i t h whom they m a y have to work for decades). L i m i -
tations of t ransferabi l i ty are therefore to be expected and they w i l l have 
the consequence of reducing m o b i l i t y between firms. There w i l l exist a 
premium of s taying where y o u are, even i f Job rights can i n principle pass 
from one person to another. 
The way i n wh ich the commitment problem w i l l be solved i n the labour 
managed marke t economy therefore is by a sufficient de facto i m m o b i l i t y 
of labour between firms. The sources of this i m m o b i l i t y can be quite 
different. I t is only impor tant that workers i n their decisions reckon 
w i t h this i m m o b i l i t y and that outside financiers reckon w i t h the fact 
that workers reckon w i t h this i m m o b i l i t y . 
There can be too m u c h or too l i t t le m o b i l i t y from the point of view of 
nat ional collective decisions. I n the absence of transferable job rights or 
d iv idend rights the discount ing bias factor going into the vot ing decision 
of i n d i v i d u a l firm members is g iven by the product of two factors: one 
being the p robab i l i ty of s t i l l being a member of the firm and the other 
being the person's share of work and benefits then d iv ided by the corres-
ponding share now. I f the person expects to be w i t h the firm then w i t h 
p robab i l i ty close to one and i f on the other hand he or she expects the 
number of workers to be shr inking through t ime, then the discounting 
bias factor is greater than un i ty , i .e . the person opts for a lower discount-
ing rate for the firm than corresponds to his personal preferences. Th i s 
case is, of course, an u n l i k e l y case. Indeed, obviously the average dis-
counting bias factor i n a firm can never be greater than un i ty , i f expec-
ta t ion about personally leaving the firm and expectat ion about the size 
of the firm's membership are consistent. 
L e t us therefore concentrate on the problem of sufficient i m m o b i l i t y . W e 
define the subjective m o b i l i t y expectat ion rate (or s imply the mobi l i ty 
rate), Q, to be the negative value of the percentage rate of change of the 
discount ing bias factor w i t h a uni t change of the future date to which i t 
refers. I n other words i f n (T) is the subjective probabi l i ty of s t i l l being 
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w i t h the firm at future date T and i f a (T) is the expected size o f the mem-
bership of the firm at future date r, then 
d log 7i (T) d log a (T) 
Q T = - 1 -
d T d z 
M a n y interesting vo t ing problems can (and should) be discussed using 
these concepts. L e t us for this paper concentrate on the ve ry simplified 
case that people are " M a r k o v i a n " i n the sense that they consider g (T) 
to be a constant independent of r . I n a M a r k o v i a n labour managed 
economy, which has a constant labour force, the parameter g, i f consistent 
w i t h observed behaviour, s imply reflects actual m o b i l i t y behaviour i n the 
sense that w i t h i n a smal l in te rva l A r, 1000 • gAr out of 1000 people w i l l 
have left their f i rm. Thus there is a close connection between the concept 
we use and easily observable phenomena of actual m o b i l i t y behaviour. 
9. T h e D e m a n d f o r M o b i l i t y as a F u n c t i o n 
o f M o b i l i t y C o s t s 
W e now have to investigate demand for m o b i l i t y a n d supply of mobi-
l i t y . B y demand for mob i l i t y we mean a person's wish to change Jobs, 
b y supply of m o b i l i t y we mean job offerings of firms to people i n the 
labour market outside the own firm. There exists, as is wel l known, 
potent ia l ly substantial m o b i l i t y or mov ing costs i n any k i n d of economic 
system. The costs are shared by the employee, Iiis former and his new 
employer. The costs m a y comprise l i te ra l mov ing costs, but this is fre-
quent ly a minor part of a l l the costs. The acquis i t ion of specific know-
ledge and s k i l l , the risks invo lved for employers and employees etc. are 
also part of these costs. The topic has drawn much at tent ion from econo-
mists i n recent years, and one k i n d of costs specifically stressed by econo-
mists has been search costs for new Jobs or for new employees. Wha t -
ever the costs are, and whoever bears these costs the m o b i l i t y of the 
labour force w i l l fal l as these costs rise. 
I n a stat ionary steady State of a labour managed economy i t is appro-
priate to say that the rate of supply ofaddi t iona l vacant Jobs i n any given 
period is just equal to the rate at wh ich these vacancies are created by 
people leaving their Jobs. Since people b y the Constitution of the system 
cannot be fired, the number of quits b y employees ( including retirement 
at retirement age or due to i l l health) determines the mob i l i t y rate. 
Whoever bears the cost, the quits w i l l be lower when the mob i l i t y costs 
are higher: even i f the direct cost is borne by the former employer or the 
new employer this w i l l be the case, because they w i l l devise incentives 
not to move i n accordance to the mov ing costs they have to bear. 
L e t us then stipulate a functional re la t ion g (c) between the mobi l i ty 
rate and the total mov ing cost per case, c, such that g' (c) < 0. Let us 
observe here that at the equi l ib r ium firm size the moving costs are not 
affected by the firm decision and dis t r ibut ion mechanism. There exists 
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a n incentive to reduce manpower below the Opt imum firm size level , as 
discussed above. Thus at the Optimum f i rm size level a pr ivate cost or 
benefit of mob i l i ty exists, which has no social counterpart. B u t this is 
w h y the Optimum firm size is not the equ i l ib r ium firm size. A t the equi-
l i b r i u m firm size the labour managed firm has just as much an incentive 
to replace people who qui t as does the capitalist firm. Therefore i n equi-
l i b r i u m , given the mov ing costs independent of the firm decision struc-
ture, the number of quits i n both Systems w i l l be the same (other things 
being equal). I f the commitment mechanism i n the labour managed 
system requires lower m o b i l i t y of labour than i n the capitalist system, 
this w i l l have to be accomplished by higher mob i l i t y costs. 
10. U n e m p l o y m e n t as a n I m m o b i l i t y F a c t o r 
L e t us now observe that search costs - a large part of m o b i l i t y costs -
are related to the unemployment rate. I f unemployment is very low and 
many Jobs are vacant , search costs are quite h igh for firms; as unemploy-
ment rises and the number of vacant Jobs declines, search costs go down 
for firms and go up for workers. There exists probably a certain un-
employment Situation such that the sum of these search costs is a m i n i -
m u m . W e may ca l l this the efficient unemployment rate. I t is l i k e l y that 
a labour managed economy which has a problem of an insufficient 
commitment mechanism, w i l l exhib i t an equ i l ib r ium rate of unemploy-
ment wh ich is above the efficient unemployment rate. Thus a mechanism 
by w h i c h to reduce m o b i l i t y to appropriate levels is to increase un-
employment. L e t u be the unemployment rate. T h e n we assume there 
exists a functional re la t ion c ( u ) , such that c' ( u ) < 0 for very smal l u 
and c' { u ) > 0 for sufficiently large u. 
B u t w h y should unemployment be the correcting mechanism? The 
reason is the inherent aggravation of differences between profitable and 
unprofitable firms which an insufficient commitment mechanism implies . 
Remember that we argued: outward m o b i l i t y of labour is negatively 
correlated w i t h the firms' prof i tabi l i ty . Unprofi table firms thus suffer 
most from the insufficient commitment mechanism. T h e y deteriorate and 
at last collapse. The i r members are unemployed - from a certain point 
onward they may prefer to be unemployed. T o establish new firms is 
difficult because the risks for the financiers are high. Therefore, the insuf-
ficient commitment mechanism leads to higher unemployment . Thus we 
stipulate a functional relat ion u (Q) w i t h u' (Q) > 0. 
The system of equations 
e = e (c) 
c = c ( u ) 
u = u (o) 
has a fixed point, i f u (Q (C (W-O))) > for sufficiently smal l UQ and 
u (o (c (^o))) < UQ for sufficientty large u0, an assumption which we can 
easily just i fy economically. 
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I f ü is the efficient rate of unemployment we can define the commit -
ment mechanism as insufficient, whenever u (g (C (Ü))) > ü, so tha t the 
equi l ib r ium unemployment rate is higher than the efficient one. A second 
equ i l ib r ium w i t h u < ü is conceivable, but i t is not of any prac t ica l 
interest, since i t is dynamica l ly unstable. Whe the r the equ i l ib r ium u > ü 
is dynamica l ly stable depends on the par t icular dynamics of the system 
which we do not want to consider here. 
B y a comparat ive static analysis we can easily see that a shift of the 
mov ing cost funct ion i n the upward direct ion w i l l reduce the commitment 
problem. Indeed, let 
c ( u ) = f ( u ) + (X 
where a is some shift parameter. Differentiat ing the equ i l ib r ium w i t h 
respect to a leads to 
dp , . . de 
de du 
du dg 
H = { e ) da 
I t can easily be seen that ^ < 0 and ^ < 0: Since u' (p) > 0 (due 
J da da * 
to the t h i r d equation) both inequalities ho ld or neither hold . B u t i f 
neither holds then aecording to the second equat ion (because in-equi-
dc 
l i b r i u m / ' ( u ) > 0) — > 0 and thus because of the first equation and 
da 
p ' (c) < 0 we have ^ß- < 0, a contradict ion. 
* da 
11. O t h e r I m m o b i l i t y M e c h a n i s m s 
Therefore, whenever mob i l i t y costs are high for reasons which are in -
dependent from the commitment problem then an automatic commitment 
mechanism is provided for a labour managed economy. F r o m this point 
of view i t wou ld be interesting to investigate carefully the discernible 
his tor ical development of mob i l i t y costs. I t wou ld also be interesting to 
make a more detai led s tudy of the precise quant i ta t ive relat ion between 
any given m o b i l i t y level and the ra t iona l i ty of inter temporal decision 
m a k i n g i n a demoeratie product ion team. Outcome of these studies might 
support or refute a conjecture that labour managed organizations have 
greater potential i n the future than they had i n the past. 
I f greater m o b i l i t y costs improve the decision process i n a labour 
managed market economy, then the device of ar t i f icial ly raising mobi l i ty 
costs is available as a Substitute for greater unemploj^ment. A t least two 
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possibilities come to m i n d . The government could impose a mobi l i ty tax. 
F o r reasons which we do not want to discuss i n detai l we believe that the 
social psychology of labour managed economies makes i t difficult to 
impose such a tax . Another more l i k e l y development is that income 
shares of workers become an increasing function of the t ime they belong 
to the firm (firm specific seniority premium) and this even beyond the 
point wh ich could be explained by corresponding p roduc t iv i ty differen-
ces. I f outside financing is important , the ra t ing of a firm and of its deci-
s ion mechanism i n the capi ta l market w i l l depend on the firm specific 
seniori ty premium. Thus pressure is exerted to develop these art if icial 
m o b i l i t y costs. T h e y are certainly a good remedy for unemployment : i t 
now becomes lucrat ive to hire new workers who get an income below 
their expected cont r ibu t ion to the Joint surplus. 
I n the context wh ich we discuss a fair comparison between capitalist 
a n d labour managed market economies must notice that psychic m o b i l i t y 
costs m a y differ substant ia l ly i n the two Systems. A worker doing a job 
s imp ly for the money he earns may not care whether to work for his 
present or for some other employer. A worker who is par t of a wel l 
funct ioning labour managed firm m a y consider i f he wants to leave a 
Communi ty to wh ich he is strongly attached. The price, for which he is 
prepared to leave m a y be high. Thus his i m m o b i l i t y may be high precisely 
because his f i r m has at t ract ive properties which a capitalist firm does 
not provide. Thus the commitment mechanism i n a labour managed 
firm m a y be a degree of firm patr iot ism which an employee of a capitalist 
firm is un l ike ly to develop. Whether part ieipatory demoeraey as an 
Organization and decision principle is able to develop a high degree of 
mora l commitment to be used as a sufficient commitment mechanism, 
this is a n unsettled question. B u t i t is plausible that those tend to answer 
i t i n the affirmative, who believe that the capitalist Organization pr in-
ciple is deficient i n meeting common human needs for self-realization 
and par t ic ipa t ion and responsibil i ty. 
12. C o n c l u s i o n 
W e believe i t w o u l d be a mis taken approach t ry ing to prove the su-
per ior i ty of one of the two Systems over the other on purely theoretical 
grounds. B o t h Systems have drawbacks and strong points i f compared 
w i t h the other. W h a t is impor tant and frui tful is a clear definition of the 
deep seated structural characteristics of the Systems so that a fair com-
par ison becomes possible. The commitment pr inciple for decision makers 
seems to be impor tant i f good decisions are to be made. Capi ta l i sm makes 
the commitment pr inciple compatible w i t h high mob i l i t y of workers and 
owners by easily transferable membership rights (tradable shares) and 
by the exclusion from decisions of those whose membership cannot be 
made easily transferable (the workers). A labour managed market 
economy makes the commitment pr inciple compatible w i t h labour 
management by reducing mobi l i ty . Is this a trade-off between worker 
au tonomy and ind iv idua l freedom? 
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S u m m a r y 
L a b o u r managed firms face some serious problems w i t h regard to the 
Provis ion of capi tal , especially of r isk-bearing capi ta l . These difficulties 
are discussed i n the first part of the paper. Subsequently i t is argued that 
these problems are rooted i n the fact that the workers are insufficiently 
commit ted to the long r u n well-being of the labour managed f i rm, i .e . i n 
the l ack ing of a sufficient commitment mechanism. A n interchange of the 
röles wh ich capi tal and labour p lay under capi ta l ism w o u l d require trad-
able job rights, an arrangement wh ich is not feasible. I t is concluded 
therefrom tha t any workable labour managed economy needs a special 
commitment mechanism. A high rate of unemployment m i g h t serve for 
th is purpose, or, more at t ract ively, a reduct ion of labour m o b i l i t y through 
appropriate incentives l ike seniority-dependent remunerat ion schemes. 
Z u s a m m e n f a s s u n g 
D i e Arbeiterselbstverwaltung v o n Betr ieben trifft auf einige ernste Pro-
bleme bei der Kapitalbeschaffung, insbesondere bei der Beschaffung von 
R i s ikokap i t a l . Diese Schwierigkei ten werden i m ersten T e i l der Arbe i t 
e r l ä u t e r t . Sie scheinen ihre Ursache da r in zu haben, d a ß die Interessen 
der Arbei te r i n zu geringem A u s m a ß an das langfristige W o h l der Unter-
nehmung gebunden s ind. E i n e Vertauschung der Ro l l en , die K a p i t a l und 
A r b e i t i m Kap i t a l i smus spielen, w ü r d e erfordern, d a ß A r b e i t s p l ä t z e von 
den Arbe i t e rn erworben u n d verkauft werden k ö n n e n , e in Arrangement, 
das aus anderen G r ü n d e n nicht s innvo l l getroffen werden kann . E s w i r d 
deshalb gefolgert, d a ß jedes a rbe i t s f äh ige Sys tem der Arbeiterselbstver-
wal tung eines speziellen Mechanismus bedarf, der die Interessen der A r -
beiter an das langfristige Unternehmensinteresse bindet. E i n e hohe A r -
beitslosigkeit k ö n n t e diesen Zweck erfül len oder aber, was wünschens -
werter erscheint, eine hohe I m m o b i l i t ä t der Arbe i t , wie sie e twa durch 
eine En t lohnung erreicht werden k ö n n t e , die an die Dauer der Betriebs-
zugehö r igke i t g e k n ü p f t ist . 
